Regional security issues.

Regional security issues. The early 1990s saw the dismantling of Cold War power relationshipsin Asia while providing no clear guidelines as to what arrangementsmight take their place. The crisintegration of the Soviet Union meantthat the Chinese, who had been skilled practitioners of triangularpolitics, could no longer play the United States United States,officially United States of America, republic (2005 est. pop. 295,734,000), 3,539,227 sq mi (9,166,598 sq km), North America. The United States is the world's third largest country in population and the fourth largest country in area. off the USSR USSR:see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. aseffectively to their own benefit. The demise of the Soviet Union alsoremoved the original raison d'etre rai��son d'����tre?n. pl. rai��sons d'��treReason or justification for existing.[French : raison, reason + de, of, for + ��tre, to be. for rapprochement between thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States just at apoint of maximum friction between the two. Chinese resentment overAmerican reaction to the PRC's decision to forcibly suppressdemonstrations at Tiananmen Square Tiananmen Square,large public square in Beijing, China, on the southern edge of the Inner or Tatar City. The square, named for its Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen), contains the monument to the heroes of the revolution, the Great Hall of the People, the museum of was heightened by a long list ofcomplaints from the United States on such issues as Chinese failure toprotect U.S. intellectual property rights; the huge and growing tradedeficit the United States was running with the PRC; sales of Chinesemissiles to the Middle East; and China's continued nuclear testing Nuclear tests are experiments carried out to determine the effectiveness, yield and explosive capability of nuclear weapons. Throughout the twentieth century, most nations that have developed nuclear weapons have staged tests of them. .The fact that the United States took the lead in forming aninternational coalition to force Iraq out of Kuwait reinforced the PRCleadership's view that America, the only remaining superpower,intended to remake the world in its own image. This stimulated a policyof Chinese resistance to perceived U.S. attempts to contain the PRC, anda vigorous assertion of its international prerogatives.Chinese suspicions notwithstanding, the United States was drasticallycutting its defense budget. The consequences of downsizing its arsenalincluded withdrawing from its bases in the Philippines, reducing thenumber of American troops in South Korea, and renegotiating its Statusof Forces Agreements so that its newly-wealthy Asian allies would assumemore of the burdens of, and responsibilities for, their own defense.Initially, Asian commentators welcomed these changes. Relieved of thetensions of the Cold War, Asians, with what some saw as a distinctlyAsian identity, would fend for Verb 1. fend for - argue or speak in defense of; "She supported the motion to strike"defend, supportargue, reason - present reasons and arguments themselves.(1) Others held forth thevision of a militarily peaceful and economically dynamic Pacificcommunity with a unique "corporate culture" on regionalsecurity that combined the best on East and West: Western concepts ofnational sovereignty and organization plus Eastern attitudes on managingdifferences.(2)While some continued to remain optimistic, others became concernedthat the disintegration of the Soviet Union and potential withdrawal ofthe United States had created a power vacuum A power vacuum is an expression for a political situation that can occur when a government has no identifiable central authority. The metaphor implies that, like a physical vacuum, other forces will tend to "rush in" to fill the vacuum as soon as it is created, perhaps in the form which would be filled byChina, either as a new emerging superpower or as hegemon heg��e��mon?n.One that exercises hegemony.[Greek hgem in the Asianregion. The first of these contentions can be dismissed: Apart fromtrade, China has minimal global interests to protect, and minimal globalreach by which to protect them. Regionally, it is otherwise. Unresolveddisputes in which China has major stake include, in order of importance,* the status of Taiwan* the Spratly Islands Spratly Islands,group of about 100 low islands and coral reefs in the central South China Sea, intersecting busy shipping lanes. The whole group is claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and parts are claimed by Malaysia and the Philippines. * the Korean PeninsulaTaiwanTaiwan, known to its inhabitants as the Republic of China (ROC), isregarded by Beijing as a breakaway province. The issue of sovereignty iscomplicated. Taiwan was a province of the Qing(3) Empire from 1885 to1895, when Japan annexed it under the terms of the Treaty ofShimonoseki The Treaty of Shimonoseki (Japanese: 下関条約, "Shimonoseki Jōyaku"), known as the Treaty of Maguan (Traditional Chinese: 馬關條約. In 1945, the Allied Powers Allied Powersor AlliesNations allied in opposition to the Central Powers in World War I or to the Axis Powers in World War II. The original Allies in World War I—the British Empire, France, and the Russian Empire—were later joined by many , victors in the Second WorldWar, assigned Taiwan to China, which was then governed by ChiangKai-shek's Kuomintang(KMT KMT Kuomintang (Taiwan's Political Party)KMT KemetKMT Kinetic Molecular TheoryKMT Kiss My TeethKMT Key Management and Distribution Toolkit ). Taiwan has remained under KMTjurisdiction ever since, though the mainland has been under the controlof the Chinese Communist Party Chinese Communist party:see Communist party, in China. Chinese Communist Party (CCP)Political party founded in China in 1921 by Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Mao Zedong, and others. (CCP (Certified Computer Professional) The award for successful completion of a comprehensive examination on computers offered by the ICCP. See ICCP and certification.. 1. (language) CCP - Concurrent Constraint Programming.2. ) since 1949. In 1991, ending fourdecades during which the CCP and KMT each claimed to be the onlylegitimate government of all China, the Kuomintang formally renouncedcontrol over the mainland. It did not, however, declare theisland's independence since the CCP has stated that a declarationof independence will be met with armed resistance. The Taiwangovernment's official position is that it is part of China, but nota province of the PRC.(4)Taiwan's spectacular economic growth was followed by equallyspectacular political development. The direct election of the presidentin March 1996 will be another milestone in the island's impressivedemocratization de��moc��ra��tize?tr.v. de��moc��ra��tized, de��moc��ra��tiz��ing, de��moc��ra��tiz��esTo make democratic.de��moc . Its Taiwanization, though less heralded, is takingplace as well. Notwithstanding the fact that virtually every inhabitant INHABITANT. One who has his domicil in a place is an inhabitant of that place; one who has an actual fixed residence in a place. 2. A mere intention to remove to a place will not make a man an inhabitant of such place, although as a sign of such intention he of the Republic of China is able to speak Mandarin, increasing numbersof people prefer not to do so. Even political candidates who were bornon the mainland now find it expedient to campaign in Taiwanese,(5) whileliterature, art and architecture show subtle, though noticeable trendsaway from mainland forms. It is hardly surprising that the developmentof this separate linguistic and cultural identity should be coupled witha desire for international recognition of the separate politicalidentity which exists in fact. The government can, and frequently does,warn that strident assertions of independence may cause the mainland toinvade. But its ability to stifle such assertions has been circumscribedby the rise of a civil society whose members are strong adherents of theright to free speech. The Kuomintang is also aware that failure to heedvoters' wishes on the matter of an international persona may meanthat the opposition Democratic Progressive Party will succeed it inpower.Approximately five years ago, the Republic of China began a policyknown as flexible diplomacy, wherein it sought to return tointernational organizations that it had left when those organizationsadmitted the PRC. Taipei also announced that it was willing to establishformal diplomatic relations with countries even though they had formaldiplomatic relations with Beijing. China's media fulminated againstwhat it termed a bald-faced attempt to institutionalize in��sti��tu��tion��a��lizev.To place a person in the care of an institution, especially one providing care for the disabled or mentally ill.in the concept oftwo Chinas and suspended diplomatic relations with several smallcountries that recognized Taiwan.China did no more than this, however. New policies in the Republic ofChina facilitated indirect trade with the mainland, and billions ofdollars from Taiwan were soon invested in mainland factories, themajority in Fujian - which is the ancestral home The Ancestral Home (Dom Ojczysty) is a political party in Poland, founded after the elections. It is a splinter of the League of Polish Families and led by Piotr Krutul. of most Taiwanese - andGuangdong. There were, to be sure, frictions in the relationship. Agroup of Taiwanese tourists were shot and burned to death by thieves whoattacked their excursion boat. And a number of illegal immigrantsheading for Taiwan suffocated when ROC officials, frustrated by theillegals' repeated attempts at re-entry, forced them below deck,nailed the hatches closed and pointed the boat back toward the mainland.But in general, relations between the two sides had never been better.This changed during the earlier part of 1995. The year openedpeacefully. On january 30th, Chinese president and CCP general secretaryJiang Zemin delivered a major speech calling for a cross-strait summiton reunification re��u��ni��fy?tr.v. re��u��ni��fied, re��u��ni��fy��ing, re��u��ni��fiesTo cause (a group, party, state, or sect) to become unified again after being divided. (6) that was generally regarded as conciliatory con��cil��i��ate?v. con��cil��i��at��ed, con��cil��i��at��ing, con��cil��i��atesv.tr.1. To overcome the distrust or animosity of; appease.2. A majorsticking point sticking pointn.A point, issue, or situation that causes or is likely to cause an impasse.Noun 1. sticking point - a point at which an impasse arises in progress toward an agreement or a goal , however, lay in China's insistence onparty-to-party negotiations while Taiwan insisted ongovernment-to-government relations. The Kuomintang government cannotagree to party-to-party negotiations because Taiwan is a multi-partystate and its highly vocal rival parties would object strenuously. TheCCP government cannot agree to government-to-government negotiations,since this might imply tacit recognition of Taiwan's sovereignstatus. The Taiwan authorities were additionally constrained in theirability to hold even informal negotiations by opposition parties'suspicions that the Kuomintang intended to make political capital out ofthe negotiations to enhance its chances in upcoming elections.(7)By springtime, the mainland's line had hardened. Unconfirmedrumors said that hardliners, never happy with Jiang's conciliatorygesture, were using the overture's lack of results to attack Jiang.he general secretary, a weak leader who owed his appointment to DengXiaoping, was becoming increasingly vulnerable as his mentor'shealth failed. This forced Jiang to take a tougher stance. Not only hadhis initiative produced no noticeable progress toward reunification, butTaiwan authorities appeared to be stepping up activities that wouldestablish the principle of two Chinas. High-ranking ROC diplomatsincluding Foreign Minister Frederick Chien and Government InformationOffice Director-General Jason Hu circled the globe in support of theROC's efforts to join the United Nations. China was not mollifiedby the pointing out that the presence of both East Germany and WestGermany in the United Nations was merely a transition stage towardreunification, and that the presence of both Koreas in the UnitedNations might be said to have facilitated rather than preventedreunification discussions between the two.Furthermore, China reacted sharply to the Clintonadministration's May 1995 announcement that it had reversed itspast policy and agreed to grant ROC president Lee Teng-hui a visa sothat he could receive an honorary degree from Cornell University, hisalma mater. The U.S. decision to reverse past policy was made fordomestic political reasons, as an angry Congress threatened to force theissue on the already beleaguered be��lea��guer?tr.v. be��lea��guered, be��lea��guer��ing, be��lea��guers1. To harass; beset: We are beleaguered by problems.2. To surround with troops; besiege. American president. But Chinese leadersprotested loudly that they had been lied to by U.S. Secretary of StateWarren Christopher, and accused the United States of complicity in asinister plot to create two Chinas.The mainland announced, and subsequently carried out, missile testingexercises in the Taiwan Strait in July and August. Shortly thereafter,war games were held which looked suspiciously as if they might be theprelude to an actual invasion. The Taipei Stock Market dropped sharply,though it recovered within a few days. And Taiwan announced its own wargames, held just before the anniversary of the 10 October 191 1revolution against the Manchus, since celebrated as the Republic ofChina's national day.At this point, tensions began to diminish. The reasons are unclear;perhaps each side felt it had made its point and that it was time toretreat from the brink. The matter of U.N. membership remained inabeyance as, for the third year in a row, China amassed enough supportto delete consideration of Taiwan's petition for membership fromthe General Assembly's agenda. No new military exercises wereannounced by either side and cross-strait economic exchanges continuedto develop, albeit on a somewhat reduced scale. Taiwan's investmenton the mainland is thought to exceed $5 billion, and is important toboth sides. China welcomes the infusion of capital and managerialexpertise and local workers appreciate the added employmentopportunities. Also, ROC business people benefit from the PRC'slower wage scale, since labor shortages on Taiwan bid up salaries to thepoint where many businesses were on the verge On the Verge (or The Geography of Yearning) is a play written by Eric Overmyer. It makes extensive use of esoteric language and pop culture references from the late nineteenth century to 1955. of losing theircompetitive edge.The Spratly IslandsThe Spratly (Nansha) Islands comprise no fewer than 104 islands,reefs, cays, and banks covering an area nearly 900 kilometers on boththeir north-south and east-west axes. Although the islands themselvesare in general uninhabitable, they lie astride a��stride?adv.1. With a leg on each side: riding astride.2. With the legs wide apart.prep.1. On or over and with a leg on each side of.2. important sea lanes andare believed to have important offshore oil deposits. Five states inaddition to China claim all or part of the Spratlys: Taiwan, Vietnam,the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. There are other contested islandsin the area too: Vietnam and China have competing claims to the Paracels(Xisha), and China, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea dispute ownership ofthe Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands. But it is the Spratlys that are mostlikely to provoke open confrontation.In March 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese forces engaged in aninconclusive encounter in the Spratlys which each side accused the otherof having initiated. The clash probably occurred when Vietnamese shipsattempted to observe Chinese construction activities on two reefsclaimed by both sides. Since the reefs are submerged for part of theyear, structures would be needed for China to be able to assert a claimof continuous occupation under international law; although Vietnamactually did have troops stationed year-round on 10 small islands, Chinahad never established a permanent garrison. China and Vietnam stronglyreiterated their respective intentions to protect territory theybelieved they were entitled to, however, there were no follow-onclashes. In February 1992, the PRC's National People'sCongress passed a law asserting China's ownership of not only theSpratlys but a large number of other islands including the Paracels, theSenkakus and Taiwan. It also claimed the right to "adopt allnecessary measures to prevent and stop the harmful passage of vesselsthrough its territorial waters territorial waters:see waters, territorial. territorial watersWaters under the sovereign jurisdiction of a nation or state, including both marginal sea and inland waters. " and for "PRC warships ormilitary aircraft to expel the intruders."(8)These unilateral actions on issues which most claimants believedshould have been settled through international negotiations disquieted anumber of countries. When it appeared that a long-awaited visit by theJapanese emperor might be jeopardized,(9) the Chinese foreign ministryattempted to soften the impact of the law, explaining that it was partof a normal domestic legislative process, did not represent a change inChinese policy, and would not affect the joint development of theislands with countries involved in the dispute.(10) This, of course,begged the question of why it had seemed necessary to pass the law inthe first place. The foreign ministry's explanation did not totallyassuage as��suage?tr.v. as��suaged, as��suag��ing, as��suag��es1. To make (something burdensome or painful) less intense or severe: assuage her grief.See Synonyms at relieve.2. regional anxieties especially when, in May, China granted oilexploration rights in a disputed area to the United States-basedCrestone Energy Corporation. Nonetheless, the issue gradually faded frompublic debate.In spring 1995, however, concerns arose anew when the Philippinesannounced that China had built concrete structures, including radarinstallations, in a contested area aptly named Mischief Reef. When thePRC asserted that these were merely for the convenience of its fishermenand had no military significance, Filipino president Fidel Ramosarranged a media tour that revealed facilities far more elaborate thanfishermen would normally need or expect. He also ordered Chineseboundary markers, presumably pre��sum��a��ble?adj.That can be presumed or taken for granted; reasonable as a supposition: presumable causes of the disaster. meant to demarcate de��mar��cate?tr.v. de��mar��cat��ed, de��mar��cat��ing, de��mar��cates1. To set the boundaries of; delimit.2. To separate clearly as if by boundaries; distinguish: demarcate categories. China's territorialwaters but located only fifty miles from the Philippines' Palawanprovince, blasted away. The PRC warned against any repetition of theseactions, saying that even another media tour might be met with Chinesemilitary action, accused the Philippines if' bullying China, toldits government not to involve the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN), organization established by the Bangkok Declaration (1967), linking the nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. (ASEAN ASEAN:see Association of Southeast Asian Nations. ASEANin full Association of Southeast Asian NationsInternational organization established by the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand in ) or the United States in the issue, and stated that the restraintshowed by the Chinese side over the Spratlys could not be permanent.(11)At the same time, while reiterating China's "principledstance," it suggested a fishing cooperation agreement that wouldprevent Chinese fishermen from being arrested near Philippineterritorial waters. The PRC's Mischief Reef demarche d����marche?n.1. A course of action; a maneuver.2. A diplomatic representation or protest.3. A statement or protest addressed by citizens to public authorities. could beconstrued in terms of a traditional Chinese admonition Any formal verbal statement made during a trial by a judge to advise and caution the jury on their duty as jurors, on the admissibility or nonadmissibility of evidence, or on the purpose for which any evidence admitted may be considered by them. "to kill thechicken in order to warn the monkey"--in this case, to deliberatelycreate a minor incident with a weak adversary in order to send a messageto a larger, and at least collectively, more powerful, group towithdraw. The greater power of the collectivity was also presumably thereason Why China insisted on bilateral negotiations to settle boundarydisputes and adamantly resisted multilateral efforts to resolvequestions which concerned several countries.A few weeks later, Indonesia announced that it had come intopossession of a Chinese map showing the Natuna Islands as part ofChina's exclusive economic zone. Since the Natunas, which containrich gas deposits, have been under Indonesian jurisdiction, the mood inJakarta was decidedly unhappy. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas wasimmediately despatched on a three-day visit to Beijing, announcing onhis return that his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen stated clearly thatthe Natuna Islands belong to Indonesia and the Chinese government hasnever claimed the islands."(12) As with the law passed in 1992,there was no explanation of how the map came to exist in the firstplace.The Korean PenisulaThe revelations from 1991 to 1992 that the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea (DPRK) either possessed or could imminently possessnuclear weapons could hardly have come as a surprise to China. The twocountries had collaborated in nuclear research for decades, and a numberof North Korea's nuclear scientists had studied in the PRC. WhenNorth Korea's intransigence in��tran��si��gentalso in��tran��si��geant ?adj.Refusing to moderate a position, especially an extreme position; uncompromising.[French intransigeant, from Spanish intransigente : with regard to International AtomicEnergy Agency International Atomic Energy Agency:see Atomic Energy Agency, International. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)International organization officially founded in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. inspections of its reactors prompted calls for the UnitedNations to impose sanctions, the PRC announced its "principledstance" against participating in such sanctions. Because ofChina's direct proximity and multitude of connections to the DPRK-- for example, there are no less than seven rail lines connecting thetwo, as well as other air and land routes -- there was a consensus thatany sanctions imposed without the PRC's participation would beineffective. China argued its principled stance against sanctions ongrounds of state sovereignty, a position that its critics see assituational rather than normative: The PRC feels that it mustconsistently defend sovereign rights, regardless of the gravity of theissue involved, lest it weaken its claim that China has the right to dowhatever it wishes within its own borders. With regard to the contentionthat there are some issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation, soimportant that they transcend the importance of sovereign rights andthat, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, thePRC has a higher duty to the collective security, one analyst summarizesChina's view as:. . . The Security Council is an important arena fordemonstrating its status as a global power and pursuingits maxi/mini realpolitik realpolitikPolitics based on practical objectives rather than on ideals. The word does not mean “real” in the English sense but rather connotes “things”—hence a politics of adaptation to things as they are. , but not a world-orderactor in the promotion of collective security.There is, deep down in Chinese world-order thinkinglittle concern or commitment to revitalizingthe United Nations Security Council as the principalinstrument for abating, or even managing, worldconflict.(13)China, of course, has interests in the Korean peninsula other thanthe protection of its views on sovereignty. North Korea's economywas close to collapse after a decade-long decline, and many analystsfelt that the North was using its nuclear capabilities in order to gainassistance and diplomatic recognition from certain countries, includingthe United States, which had continued to withhold it, China cannottruly desire a nuclearized North Korea. On the one hand, PRC officialshave hinted to foreign counterparts that they are concerned with theinstability of the DPRK's leadership. Moreover, North Korea'saccession to the nuclear club would deprive China of the cachet cachet/ca��chet/ (ka-sha��) a disk-shaped wafer or capsule enclosing a dose of medicine. ca��chetn.An edible wafer capsule used for enclosing an unpleasant-tasting drug. of beingthe only East Asian state to possess nuclear weapons, and court set offa dangerous round or proliferation. It could also rekindle re��kin��dle?tr.v. re��kin��dled, re��kin��dling, re��kin��dles1. To relight (a fire).2. To revive or renew: rekindled an old interest in the sciences. Japaneseinterest in constructing a missile defense shield that would degrade thedeterrent effect of the PRC's nuclear capability. More worrisomestill for the Chinese leadership, with its vivid memories of the SecondWorld War, Japan might be moved to remilitarize.On the other hand, neither would China welcome the collapse of theDPRK. The trade and business ties the PRC has built up with South Koreain recent years are important to China's economic development. Buta Korea unified under the South could be difficult to deal with, and thedemise of North Korea would further reduce the already dwindling numberof socialist states. In short, China has played a delicate game on theKorean peninsula in such a way as to maximize its own best interests.Other IssuesChina has a major interest in two other matters of regionalcontroversy in which no issues of territorial jurisdiction are involved.First is the matter of nuclear testing. Although the PRC has stated itswillingness to participate in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)officially Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsInternational agreement intended to prevent the spread of nuclear technology. It was signed by the U.S. (NPT NPT National Pipe Taper (pipe thread specification)NPT Non-Proliferation TreatyNPT Nonprofit TimesNPT Newport (Rhode Island)NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation TreatyNPT Neath Port Talbot ), it conducted three weapons tests in 1994 and two more in 1995.The May 1995 test occurred only four days after 178 countries had agreedon an indefinite extension of the NPT and a week after Japanese primeminister Murayama's state visit to Beijing, during which herequested that China not conduct such tests.Responding to numerous protests, PRC spokespersons said that, whileChina welcomed the NPT renewal, this renewal should be viewed as a steptoward denuclearization rather than as an end in itself. There had beenno change in China's principled stance on the eventual completedestruction of all nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, however, China wouldcontinue to conduct tests until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)is concluded.(14) Assuming that the CTBT iS completed on schedule in1996, there would be a minimum of three years before China is legallyrequired to stop testing. Experts estimate that this would be sufficienttime for six to nine more tests at the present pace, and one to two morewarhead designs.(15) China has also continued to advocate that the CTBTmake provision for peaceful nuclear explosions Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) are nuclear explosions conducted for non-military purposes, such as activities related to economic development including the creation of canals. During the 1960s and 1970s, both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted a number of PNEs. , although there is littlesupport for this position elsewhere. Arms control experts argue thatpeaceful nuclear explosions are unsafe as well as uneconomical for theresource extraction purposes for which the PRC purports to want them.They also argue that the determination of whether a test is conductedfor peaceful or military purposes is more difficult to determine thanthe Chinese have alleged.Less than two weeks after it announced that it intended to continueits nuclear tests, China again raised regional anxieties by test in theEast Wind 31, a solid-fuel ballistic missile fired from a mobilelauncher. The East Wind 31 is capable of carrying a 700 kg (1,540 lb)nuclear warhead and has a range of 8000 k&(4,960 miles), althoughthe actual test missile had a 2000 km (1,240 mile) trajectory It isbelieved to be much more accurate than previous Chinese intercontinentalballistic missiles.(16)China has been a mainstay of Burma's State Law and Order Council(SLORC SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council ) since that body became an international outcast by refusing toallow Aung Sari Suu Kyi to assume the leadership post she was elected toin 1988. The international notoriety that accrued to China after itsbrutal suppression of unarmed demonstrators in June 1989 promptedobservers to see the China-Burma friendship as an alliance of outcasts.China has delivered arms at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion to theSLORC. These include tanks, armored personnel carriers, fighter planes,multiple rocket launchers and small arms. The sum total of these weaponswill make it still harder for democratic forces to oppose the rulingjunta. Chinese engineers have helped to construct three highways fromthe border of the PRC's Yunnan province into Burma whichanti-government Burmese point out could be the springboard for a Chinesetakeover of their country China has also assisted in expanding andupgrading several naval bases. Also, PRC-manufactured radarinstallations at the Cocos Islands base enable Chinese intelligencepersonnel to monitor the area which has invited speculation that Chinawas cooperating with slorc as a means to obtain an outlet to the Bay ofBengal Noun 1. Bay of Bengal - an arm of the Indian Ocean to the east of IndiaAndaman Sea - part of the Bay of Bengal to the west of the Malay PeninsulaIndian Ocean - the 3rd largest ocean; bounded by Africa on the west, Asia on the north, Australia on the east and the Andaman Sea. This would give the Chinese navy a presencein an area heretofore dominated by India.The growth of a military relationship with Laos paralleled that withBurma. China and Laos signed a military cooperation agreement inNovember 1993; less than a year later, three signals intelligencestations had been installed in the Southern Laotian province ofChampasak, bordering both Cambodia and Thailand. The installation'sability to monitor communications within a 120 km radius bespeaksconcern with activities along the frontier.17 In October 1995, the PRC, Laos and Burma announced a joint borderagreement that was officially described as "strengthening the tiesrelationship, cooperation and understanding" among the threecountries.(18) That China should feel it necessary to enhance itscapabilities in the area added to regional anxieties about thePRC's intentions there.The Chinese MilitaryAlso contributing to regional fears of China has been the perceptionthat the Peoile's Liberation Army Pia) is rapidly modernizing aswell as becoming more assertive in support of the countrys irredentist ir��re��den��tist?n.One who advocates the recovery of territory culturally or historically related to one's nation but now subject to a foreign government. claims. Defense budgets have nearly tripled over the last seven years,from 21.53 billion yuan ($5.89 billion) in 1988 to 63.1 billion yuan($7.48 billion)(19) in 1905. China has purchased Sukhoi--27 fighterplanes and Kilo-class submarines' from Russia and has beennegotiating a co-production agreement to manufacture Su-27s in the PRCto develop the country's indigenous production capability. The PLA (Programmable Logic Array) A type of programmable logic chip (PLD) that contained arrays of programmable AND and OR gates. PLAs are no longer used. See PLD. (language, music) Pla - A high-level music programming language, written in SAIL. also has three million active duty members, making it the largestmilitary in the world. Since China is also by far the largest country inthe world, it can call up more recruits than any other country shouldthe need arise. Moreover, it is feared the PLA leadership is becomingmore assertive in support of irredentist causes. On several occasions,civilian leaders have reportedly received letters signed by groups ofhigh-ranking military figures demanding a stronger stand on such issuesas assertions of independence emanating from Taiwan, moves towarddemocratically-elected governments in Hong Kong and perceived bullyingby the United States.The PRC has been at pains to counter the image of an emergingmilitary juggernaut. As explained by State Council Minister Hu Ping,most of what looks like a rapidly escalating budget canbe accounted for by an inflation rate which is also high. Part of therest was used to offset debts the PLA had accumulated because of undulylow military expenditures in the past.(20) Military spending is in factdeclining in proportion to China's total gross national product(GNP GNPSee: Gross National Product ), accounting for 1.7 percent Of GNP in 199 1; 1.5 per cent in 1992;and 1.3 percent in 1993. The PRC's per capita [Latin, By the heads or polls.] A term used in the Descent and Distribution of the estate of one who dies without a will. It means to share and share alike according to the number of individuals. military spending wasequivalent to $5 in 1994, compared with $1,000 for the United States,$360 for Japan and $8 for India. The PLA was poorly equipped, and in anycase China wished to concentrate on domestic construction anddevelopment. Hu stated emphatically that the PRC sought neitherexpansion nor hegemony.(21)Hu makes several valid points, although some clarification is inorder. While the published defense budget has indeed barely kept up withinflation, it is also the case that the published defense budget isbelieved to represent approximately one-third to one-fourth ofChina's actual defense expenditures.(22) Its neighbors' callsfor more transparency on defense spending have been ignored. Moreover,unlike Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, China has never published adefense White Paper.(23)Hu's contention that the PLA is poorly equipped is correct. Sofar, the PRC has purchased just 26 Su-27s. These are hardly sufficientto give China a margin of victory in time of war, even if the PLA'Swoeful woe��fulalso wo��ful ?adj.1. Affected by or full of woe; mournful.2. Causing or involving woe.3. Deplorably bad or wretched: record on aircraft maintenance could be improved to the levelthat all 26 planes were combat-ready. In-flight refuelling re��fu��el?v. re��fu��eled also re��fu��elled, re��fu��el��ing also re��fu��el��ling, re��fu��els also re��fu��elsv.tr.To supply again with fuel.v.intr. is more of atheoretical than an actual capability and the navy and ground forceshave similar deficiencies in equipment and training.(24) In thesummation of a Western military officer, the Chinese military'spower "dissipates exponentially as the distance from the homelandincreases."(25) While this is true, many of its potential Asianadversaries -- for example, the Philippines -- are even weaker. AndChina's inventory of weapons, despite being outmoded, is severaltimes as large as those of potential adversaries. Even technologicallysophisticated militaries can be overwhelmed by sheer force of numbers. Anightmare scenario for ROC planners is an attack on Taiwan by thousandsof fishing junks. The Taiwan military's own simulations show theROC'S Indigenous Defense Fighters and F-16s succumbing in a war ofattrition The War of Attrition (Hebrew: מלחמת ההתשה‎, Arabic: with large numbers of less capable mainland F-7s flown by lesswell-trained pilots.(26)Western intelligence analysts are uniformly skeptical of lettersallegedly sent to China's civilian leadership by groups of generalsurging a harder line on international issues. All of these letters, theynote, have appeared only in the Hong Kong press and very few can beconfirmed on the basis of other sources. However, they add, there areother, more effective, private channels through which military leaderscan make their views known. With regard to statements by Hu and othersthat China wishes to concentrate on domestic development, these will notreassure countries who find that all (in the case of Taiwan) or part(Spratly Islands claimants) of the territory they believe is theirs isbelieved by the PLA'S to be part of its domestic jurisdiction.Nevertheless, the PLA'S poor power projection capabilities andChina's many internal problems (27) place very real constraints onits ability to assert itself regionallyRegional ResponsesAsian states have a variety of options, both singly and collectively,in response to the PRC'S apparent attempt to move into a hegemonicposition in the region. The path of least resistance Noun 1. path of least resistance - the easiest way; "In marrying him she simply took the path of least resistance"line of least resistancefashion - characteristic or habitual practice , that ofaccommodation to China's wishes, seems to be unacceptable to moststates therein. Another proposed remedy, that of using the United Statesto counter the PRC, is unfeasible.(28) America has refused to take aposition on the ownership of the disputed Spratly Islands. Although theUnited States is congressionally mandated through the Taiwan RelationsAct The Taiwan Relations Act is an act of the United States Congress passed in 1979 after the establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China and the breaking of relations between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan by President Jimmy Carter. of 1979 to maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait,American intervention in a Chinese attack on Taiwan cannot necessarilybe assumed. The official U.S. position has been to express its desirethat both sides come to an agreement on the sovereignty of Taiwanthrough peaceful means. Despite pressure from both sides of the TaiwanStrait however, the United States has not said what it would do if theprocess turned belligerent. Several countries have expressed the needfor a continued American military presence in the area.(29) Americanstatements on its intentions to remain actively engaged in Asia(30)should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the United States may notbe as active as some states would prefer.Individual state responses have ranged from the legal to themilitaristic mil��i��ta��rism?n.1. Glorification of the ideals of a professional military class.2. Predominance of the armed forces in the administration or policy of the state.3. . Several claimants to the Spratlys amassed historical andlegal documents to bolster their respective cases for sovereignty.Vietnam, its lack of diplomatic relations with the United States at thetime notwithstanding, hired the prestigious Washington law firmCovington & Burring to assess how the International Court of Justicewould settle boundaries in the Blue Dragon and Vanguard Bank areas whoseownership it contests with China.(31)Japan seeks to constrain the PRC from behavior it considersunacceptable through using China's awareness of the importance ofJapanese capital, technology and managerial expertise to its continuedeconomic development. Only rarely are these pressures publicly seen. Inone recent instance, the Murayama government announced that it wassuspending its 1995 grant aid to the PRC in light of China'scontinued nuclear testing. China responded publicly, calling theJapanese move "unwise", "totally unreasonable" and"harmful to Sino-Japanese relations."(32) Tokyo replied thatit would not resume the aid until Beijing agreed to end its testing.(33)At the same time, the Japanese government announced that it would loanapproximately $50 million to Burma; a desire to reduce the SLORC"Sdependence on China was one of several motives behind thegenerosity.(34)Malaysian foreign minister Badawi observed pointedly that if theconflicting Spratlys claims were not brought under control, they wouldhave a negative effect on the area's security and that, despiteChina's reluctance to refer the dispute to a third party, it wouldbe necessary to do so to avoid tension in the region.(35) An editorialin the Bangkok Post noted that Beijings decision to resort to harshrhetoric rather than explanations for its missile tests off Taiwan andescalating arms exports was worrisome.(36) And an Indonesian newspapercovering the "Defense Asia 95" arms exhibition attributed theinterest in arms purchases to Southeast Asian states' concerns withthe PRC'S growing military assertiveness, even as the United Stateswas wit drawing from the region.(37) some of these purchases might beconstrued as aimed at generalized domestic security -- for example,coastal patrol boats as a deterrent to smugglers and pirates -- therecould be little doubt that fear of China was the major reason for theescalation in arms acquisitions.In the Philippines, there was a marked change in the hithertoprevailing view that China was both far away and benign. PresidentRamos, a West Point graduate and former military commander, quickly drewup plans that would enable the country to police its 7,100 islands andto deter intrusions into its exclusive economic zone. The generallyfrugal Filipino Senate approved with minimal debate a bill that woulddramatically increase military spending. Appropriately, the mainrecipient of these funds will be the navy. Forty percent of the fundsare earmarked for combatant vessels, including missile-equipped frigatesand corvettes. Ship-borne rotary wing aircraft and anti-submarinewarfare capabilities are also to be increased. More army bases as wellas naval and air stations will be established, and the air force isauthorized to purchase sophisticated fighter planes such as the For 16Mirage 2000.(38) Other countries increased their arms acquisitions aswell. Malaysia has purchased Hawk aircraft from Britain, MiG-29 fightersfrom Russia and F/A-18D multi-role aircraft from the United States. Itsnavy has ordered frigates from Britain.(39) Singapore has improved itsair defenses by adding an additional battalion equipped with Mistral Mis��tral? , Fr��d��ric 1830-1914.French writer and leader in the revival of Proven?al as a literary language. He shared the 1904 Nobel Prize for literature.mis��tral?n. surface-to-air missiles purchased from France; it has also bought F-16fighter planes from the United States and is taking part in asubmarine-training program offered by Sweden. Mine countermeasures andanti-submarine capabilities are also being strenghened.(40) Thailand hasmade major purchases of tanks and planes from the United States andcontinues to debate the wisdom of acquiring submarines versusminesweepers.(41)Taiwan, due to its proximity to the Chinese mainland, is perhaps mostconcerned with the need to build up its defenses. Theroc was already theworld's eleventh largest arms purchaser in 1994,(42) when tensionsin the Taiwan Strait were much lower. Now, the military plans a 20percent increase in spending for fiscal year 1996.(43) Despite its hugecash reserves Cash reservesSee: Cash investmentscash reservesInvestment funds that are held in short-term assets such as Treasury bills and certificates of deposit until more permanent investment opportunities are available. , the ROC has found it difficult to acquire all that itfeels it needs, since many countries are unwilling to incur the wrath ofChina by selling arms to the island. But, the United States and Francehave been less easily intimidated than other countries. Taiwan hasacquired four E-2T planes as part of its "Strong Net" programto upgrade airborne reconnaissance and combat capabilities; these aresaid to have extended Taiwan's early warning time from 5 to 25minutes.(44) In addition, it has expressed interest in purchasing U-2spy planes.(45) The air force has also acquired Mirage 2000-5 and F-16fighter planes from France and the United States, respectively. Taiwanalso produces its own Indigenous Defense Fighter. Naval upgrades includelocally manufactured guided missile frigates based on the U.S.Perry-class frigates purchased from France. Taiwan has in additioncontracted for Patriot air defense systems,(46) Mistral surface-to-airmissiles(47) and Milan anti-tank missiles.(48) Opposition from China,however, has for the past decade prevented it from acquiring submarines.Even Japan signalled that it was concerned that its economic powerwould not be enough to constrain China from actions that Tokyoconsidered hostire. A Defense White Paper published in mid- 1995contains a substantial section on China's military buildup as wellas that of North Korea. Japanese commentators interpreted the WhitePaper as calling for the continued modernization of the Self DefenseForces.(49) In September, the Defense Agency, noting that China haddeployed Su-27s I announced plans to reinforce the country's airalert system and to replace its F-4EF fighters in Okinawa with F-15s"so that Japan can respond to neighboring countries'modernization of their military forces and possible outbreaks ofregional conflicts."(50) Also, the first of a planned 141 FSX FSX Flight Simulator XFSX Financial Services ExchangeFSX Fire Support ExecutionFSX File System Xml fighters, the most expensive fighter-bomber in the world, successfullycompleted its initial test flight in October.(51) A week later, Tokyoannounced that Japan and the United States had been discussing jointresearch on theater missile defense.(52)There were also bilateral responses to China's perceivedexpansionism ex��pan��sion��ism?n.A nation's practice or policy of territorial or economic expansion.ex��pansion��ist adj. & n. . Several countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, haveconducted joint exercises for many years, and these continued alongestablished patterns. Malaysia also sought out new partners, setting upa joint defense industry cooperation committee with South Korea,(53) andindicating that it was interested in ties with the South Africanmilitary.(54) Moreover, India and Indonesia initiated joint navalexercises.Both external analysts and concerned parties in the states who areapprehensive about China's intentions agree that multilateralresponses would be far preferable to a situation in which individualcountries fear that the PRC intends to pick them off one by one.(55)There is, however, no obvious way to engage China collectively. Asia,with its wide range of different cultures, religions, and threatperceptions, has historically been weak in such institutions. ASEAN haseschewed a military role. Moreover, it works by consensus rather thanmajority vote. On the matter of the Spratlys, three of its members,Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, are nonclaimant states. Theorganization was nonetheless happy to welcome Vietnam into membership inJuly 1995. Several member states also expressed approval when the UnitedStates and Vietnam established diplomatic relations at the same time,hypothesizing that the combination of these two events wouldcounterbalance Chinese assertiveness.(56)The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization has, like ASEAN,avoided discussions on security issues. The Asian Regional Forum (ARF)was established in July 1994 to provide a high-level consultativeframework. Although China is a member, it insists that it will consultonly bilaterally on security issues. In light of the fact thatChina's claims in such areas as the Spratly Islands are quitestrong,(57) Some scholars seem puzzled by the PRC is reluctance todiscuss the issue in multilateral fora. An analyst of nuclear armsnegotiations provides the probable answer:...what China's bargaining behavior shows is that itis reluctant to engage in formal multilateral armscontrol processes precisely because it knows theseare likely to be the most effective in constraining itsmilitary capabilities. This is because the image costsfrom backing out of these kinds of processes areextremely high.(58)The principle holds for China's attitude toward other regionalissues as well. If the image costs of withdrawing from a collectivebargaining collective bargaining,in labor relations, procedure whereby an employer or employers agree to discuss the conditions of work by bargaining with representatives of the employees, usually a labor union. process will be high, then it is best to avoid allowingoneself to become engaged collectively. Not surprisingly therefore, thefirst two meetings of ARF have been inconclusive, long on piouspronouncements and shorts on results. The organization has created noconflict resolution mechanisms and seems hesitant to address the issueof doing so. While it is difficult to disagree with pompous cliches onthe need to draw the PRC into a constructive dialogue, it should also bepointed out that all that has taken place so far has been dialogue, andthat not all dialogues will be constructive. The United States and Japanfor example, were exchanging views somewhat amicable until the day ofthe attack on Pearl Harbor. Nor does that other hoary hoar��y?adj. hoar��i��er, hoar��i��est1. Gray or white with or as if with age.2. Covered with grayish hair or pubescence: hoary leaves.3. anodyne anodyne/an��o��dyne/ (an��ah-din)1. relieving pain.2. a medicine that eases pain.an��o��dynen.An agent that relieves pain. , thateconomic growth will lead to an abatement in security concerns,necessarily follow. As has been pointed out, economic and securityissues frequently unfold at different times and at different speeds.While economic trends are often self-correcting, security trends aregenerally not. Moreover, economic boycotts decided upon by collectivesecurity organizations typically hurt the producer who complies far morethan the consumer who is the target. And, while national leaders arefrequently able to determine their respective countries' strategicdirection, they have much less control over their states' economicaffairs.(59) Economic growth may sharpen rather than blunt securityrivalries and may also facilitate the growth of defense budgets.ConclusionsIn Robert Gilpin's formulation, a state dissatisfied with thestatus quo [Latin, The existing state of things at any given date.] Status quo ante bellum means the state of things before the war. The status quo to be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. will seek to change it through territorial, political, andeconomic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equalto or greater than the marginal benefits.(60) China is such a state.Clearly, it is also in possession of most of the attributes that wouldallow it to play the role of regional hegemon. Thus far, states who feelthreatened by China's territorial, political and economic expansionhave been unwilling or unable to raise these marginal costs to anythingapproaching the level of marginal benefits to China. For example, if itis true that China does not wish to engage in collective negotiationsbecause the image costs of backing out of these negotiations are high,then it would be in the best interests of states who perceive themselvesto be threatened by Chinese hegemony to heighten the image costs to thePRC Of its refusal to participate in collective negotiations.Should the benefits to China continue to outweigh the costs ofexpansion, the chief constraints on China's rise to hegemony willnot be international but domestic: the PLA's limited powerprojection capabilities and the country's many internal problems.Until such time as the other states of Asia can reach a consensus on howto counter the PRC's assertiveness, there will be no significantcost to China of that assertiveness.(1)See, e.g., Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia,"Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 5 (November to December 1993) pp. 75-85. (2)Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Impulse," Survival, 37, no. 1(Spring 1995) p. 116. (3) The Qing were not Han Chinese but ratherManchus. (4) As stated by Government Information Office Director-GeneralJason Hu on Firing Line, 14 October 1995. (5) The mother tongue ofTaiwanese is minnan, spoken in Fujian; min is the classical Chinese namefor Fujian. (6) See "President Urges Cross-Strait Summit,"Beiling Review (6-19 February 1995) p. 5. In a poll taken by theKMT's Policy Research Committee in October 1995, only 10 percent ofrespondents approved of a cross-strait summit before the ROC'spresidential election. See Sofia Wu, "Taiwan People FavorCross-Strait Summit, But Not Now," Central News Agency (CNA (Certified NetWare Administrator) See Novell certification. ,Taipei), 13(8) The text of this law may be found in Xinhua (Beijing), 25February 1992, in United States Technical Information Service, ForeignBroadcast Information Service. Volume 1: China (FBIS-CHI), 28 February1992, pp. 2-3. (9) More than the imperial visit was at stake. SinceJapanese right-wing political forces were particularly vociferous aboutthe affront to their country's sovereignty, some Chinese leadersworried that the law would give ammunition to those who wished toremilitarize Japan. (10) See Ma Baolin, "Legislation Doesn'tMean Policy Change," Beijing Review (30 March to 5 April 1992) pp.10-11. (11) Merlinda Manolo, PRC Warns, Offers Cooperation Pact inSpratlys," Manila Standard (Manila), 23 July 1995, p. 4. (12)Antara (Jakarta), 21 July 1995, in Foreign Broadcast InformationService: Volume IV East Asia and the Pacific (FBIS-EAS) 24 July 1995,p.75. (13) Samuel S. Kim, "China and the Third World," inChina and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold Warera,ed. Samuel S. Kim, 3rd edition, (Boulder CO: 1994) p. 143. (14) Xinhua(Beijing), 15 May 1995. (15) Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects forChinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence VersusMultilateral Arms Control," China Quarterly (forthcoming, June1996). (16) Nigel Holloway, A Chill Wind: Stealthier Nuclear MissileRaises U.S. Fears," Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 15June 1995, pp. 15-16. (17) Robert Karniol, "China Sets Up BorderSIGINT Noun 1. SIGINT - intelligence information gathered from communications intelligence or electronics intelligence or telemetry intelligencesignals intelligence Bases in Laos," Jane's Defense Weekly (19 November1994) p. 5. (18) KPL KPL Khaosan Pathet Lao (News Agency, Laos)KPL Korporaal (Dutch)KPL Korporal (German)KPL Kansas Power & LightKPL Kerry Properties LimitedKPL Kit Parts List (expansion unknown; Vientiane), 12 October 1995,translated in13 October 1995, p. 58. (19) The apparent discrepancy in theconversion factor between yuan and dollars reflects several currencydevaluations which occurred in the interim(20) There was a sharp, one-time increment in the PLA'S budgetin 1979 to cover the costs of the war with Vietnam, followed by nearly adecade of very modest budgets which in several years did not even keepup with the inflation rate. There were complaints of poor barracksmaintenance, poor food and poor morale, as well as rising corruptionthat was driven by the need to deal with budgetary shortfalls. (21) HuPing, "China Constitutes No Military Threat," Beijing Review(21-2 7 November 1994) p. 22. A large number of other Chinese sourcesmake similar points. (22) International Institute for Strategic Studies The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) is a British research institute (or think tank) in the area of international affairs. It describes itself as "the world’s leading authority on political-military conflict". ,The Military Balance 1995-1996 (London: Brassey's 1995) pp.270-275, details the ways in which Chinese statistics underestimate theactual defense budget. The compilers believe the real figure to be fourtimes that of the official figures. (23) The PRC published its firstWhite Paper shortly after this article was written. It does not,however, provide the transparency that external observers had hoped for.(24) See Dreyer, "The PLA'S New Officer Corps: ImplicationsFor the Future," China Quarterly (June 1996) (forthcoming) for amore detailed discussion of these points. (25) Karl W Eikenberry,"Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Stability?"Parameters (Spring 1995) pp. 90-91. (26) For a cogent summary of likelyscenarios of a PRC-ROC confrontation, see Hsueh Erhmen,"Taiwan's Trans-century Crisis and Survival: a Great Debate onT-Day," Chientuan ke-chi (Cutting Edge Technology; Taipei), 1 April1995, pp. 102-1 1 1. (27) These include environmental degradation,uneven economic development, growing numbers of citizens who do notautomatically comply with their leaders' orders and a successioncrisis. See the articles by Dali Yang and Peter Ferdinand elsewhere inthis issue. (28) A professor at the United States Naval Academy United States Naval Academy,at Annapolis, Md.; for training young men and women to be officers of the U.S. navy or marine corps. George Bancroft, Secretary of the Navy, founded and opened (1845) it as the Naval School at Annapolis. on aspeaking tour of Southeast Asia found himself asked repeatedly, even bymilitary officers whom he thought should know better, why the UnitedStates did not immediately bomb or shell the Chinese installations onMischief Reef. Those who did not demand immediate violence asked whyWashington did not send a message to Beijing announcing that suchstructures would not be tolerated and demanding that they be removed.See Stephen Wrage, "Mature Response to Chinese Moves Is Needed inAsia" Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, 8 May 1995, p. 16. (29)See, e.g, "The United States Military Presence is Still Necessaryin Southeast Asia," Kompas (Jakarta), 5 August 1995, p. 4,translated in FBIS-EAS, 9 August 1995, p. 60; "New Security PolicySould Include U.S.," Bangkok Post, 2 October 1995, p. 4.Immediately after the Philippine senate asked the United States tovacate To annul, set aside, or render void; to surrender possession or occupancy.The term vacate has two common usages in the law. With respect to real property, to vacate the premises means to give up possession of the property and leave the area totally devoid of contents. its military bases in that country, Singapore and Malaysiaseparately offered the use of facilities in their respective countries.(30) See, for example, Assistant Secretary of Defense forInternationalSecurity Joseph Nye's "The Case for DeepEngagement," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 4 (july to August 1995) pp.90-102, which is more appropriate to a Fourth of July Fourth of July,Independence Day,or July Fourth,U.S. holiday, commemorating the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. Celebration of it began during the American Revolution. speech than topublication in a scholarly journal. (31) Covington & Burling'sopinion was that Blue Dragon lies on Vietnam's continental shelf,and that Vanguard Bank, which the PRC has already leased to the CrestoneEnergy Corporation, is also in Vietnamese waters. See Barry Wain,"International Law Firm Hired By Hanoi Asserts Vietnam Is Entitledto Disputed Areas' Deposits," Asian Wall Street JournalWeekly; 19 June 1995, p. 5. (32) Gu Ping, "An Unwise Move,"Renmin ribao (People's Daily; Beijing), 9 September 1995, p. 3.(33) Kyodo (Tokyo), 13 October 1995. (34)Other motivations included,first, a desire to reward the SLORC for having released Aung San Suu Kyi Aung San Suu Kyi(oung sän s chē), 1945–, Burmese political leader. from house arrest and, second, the desire to counter loans alreadyextended by its economic rival South Korea. See Sankei shimbun (Tokyo),5 October 1995, p. 1, translated in FBIS-EAS, 17 October 1995, p. 15.(35) Utusan Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), 15 July 1995, p. 33, translated inFBIS-EAS, 18 July 1995, p. 43. (36) "China Must Explain ItsOutbursts To Neighbors," Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 27 July 1995, p.4. (37) "Southeast Asia's Arms Market is the Focus ofAttention at the `Defense Asia 95' Arms Exhibition," Kompas(Jakarta), 19 September 1995, p. 4, translated in FBIS-EAS, 21 September1995, pp. 55-56. (38) Kyodo (Tokyo), 13 August 1995, inFBIS-EAS, 14August 1995, p. 79. (39) IISS IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, UK)IISS Institute of International and Social StudiesIISS Indian Institute of Soil Science (Bhopal, India)IISS India International Sign Show , The Military Balance 1994-1995, 1994, p.166. (40) Raoul Le Blond, "Navy To Buy Used Submarine FromSweden," The Sunday Times (Singapore), 24 September 1995, p. 3,inFBIS-EAS, 26 September 1995, pp. 60-61. (41) See, for example,"Defense Minister Views Purchase of U.S. Tanks," BangkokPost,22 September 1995, p. 1, for a brief discussion on how best toupgrade Thai defenses. (42) Benjamin Yeh, "Taiwan 11th Largest ArmsImporter," CNA, 4 October 1995. (43) Benjamin Yeh,"Anti-Missile Research Underway, Chiang Says," CNA, 11 October1995. (44) Lilian Wu, "Final 2 E-2T AWACS AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System)Mobile, long-range radar surveillance-and-control centre for air defense. Used by the U.S. Air Force since 1977, AWACS is mounted in a specially modified Boeing 707 aircraft, with its main radar antenna affixed to a rotating dome. Arrive From U.S. 23Sep," CNA, 25 September 1995. (45) Bill Wang and Sofia Wu,"Magazine Says Taiwan Interested in Buying U-2s," CNA, 19September 1995. (46) Benjamin Yeh, "Anti-Missile Research Underway,Chiang Says," CNA, 11 October 1995. (47) Sofia Wu, "ROC ArmyBrass Leaves For France For Mistral Deal," CNA, 13 October 1995.(48) "Taiwan Planning To Purchase Milan Missile," Chung-shihwan-pao (Taipei), 3 October 1995, in FBIS-CHI, 12 October 1995, p. 46.(49) "Editorial Critiques 1995 Defense White Paper," Tokyoshimbun (Tokyo), 3 July 1995, p. 5, translated inFBIS-EAS, 12 July 1995,pp. 29-30.(50) "DA To Reinforce Air Raid Alert System," Nihon keizaishimbun Nihon Keizai Shimbun (日本経済新聞, (Tokyo), 20 September 1995, p. 2 translated in FBIS-EAS, 21September 1995, p. 6. (51) Kyodo, 7 October 1995. (52) "Tokyo, U.S.Study Missile Technology Research," Nihon keizai shimbun, 13October 1995, p. 1, translated in FBIS-EAS, 17 October 1995, pp. 10-11.(53) "Defense Industry Panel With Malaysia Forming," The KoreaHerald (Seoul), 8 July 1995, p. 3, in FBIS-EAS, 11 July 1995, p. 54.(54) TV 1 Network (Johannesburg), 9 August 1995, in FBIS-EAS, 9 August1995, p. 56. See, e.g., Barry Wain, "China's Nibbling StokesSecurity Concerns," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, 20 March1995, p. 14. (56) See, e.g., Ellen Tordesillas, "Balancing Power inAsia," Malaya (Quezon City), 1 July 1995, p.6, in FBIS-EAS, 18 July1995, p. 48. (57) See, e.g., Greg Austin, "China's OceanLimits -- Time To Settle," paper presented to the United StatesInstitute of Peace The United States Institute of Peace or USIP was established in 1986 by the United States Congress to study the "prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts" [1]. , 4 September 1995. (58) Johnston, China Quarterly(forthcoming, June 1996). (59) So argues Peter Ackerman in,"'The Economic Aspects of Pacific Security': AReply," in Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era:Part I, Adelphi Paper 275, IISS (March 1993) pp. 31-32. (60) RobertGilpin, War and Change in World Polities (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press Cambridge University Press (known colloquially as CUP) is a publisher given a Royal Charter by Henry VIII in 1534, and one of the two privileged presses (the other being Oxford University Press). , 198I) p. 106.