Representations in Archaeology.

Representations in Archaeology. This book constitutes a virtually unique event in archaeology;collaboration between French and 'Anglo-Saxon' scholars on athematic work. Despite the physical proximity of Britain and Europe,communication between Anglophone and Francophone archaeologists has beenbad (excepting British forays to Calais hypermarkets) and understandingsometimes non-existent. However, Representations in archaeology may be asign of change; for the papers therein are evidence that each communitycan learn from the other.In the space available I cannot do justice to 390 pages and 20chapters. There are, indeed, good and bad among them; I enjoyed thecontributions of Jean Molino, Dan Sperber, Susan Kus, Chris Chippindale(no sycophancy syc��o��phan��cy?n. pl. sy��co��phan��ciesThe fawning behavior of a sycophant; servile flattery.Noun 1. sycophancy - fawning obsequiousness intended) and Henri-Paul Francfort. I found the papers byMichael Fotiadis and Chris Peebles (in Fotiadis' own words)'too labyrinthine lab��y��rin��thineadj.Of, relating to, resembling, or constituting a labyrinth.labyrinthinepertaining to or emanating from a labyrinth. to be of relevance to anything'. But, ratherthan make this a Michelin Guide to the book, I prefer to concentrate ona few themes.The, publication's theme is that of semiotics in archaeology,though the editors acknowledge some diversity of purpose. But what issemiotics exactly? As Molino admits, there are as many'semiotics' as there are semioticians (even the name isnegotiable). Sure, this is the science of signs in all their diversity,but our major issue seems to be what exactly constitutes a sign orsymbol in the archaeological record. Recent talk of the archaeologicalrecord as as a text is too narrow: 'Spoken words and written texts... make one, but only one of a large and diverse range of humancultural systems' (Chippindale). For, on the one hand, languageitself is not just communication, whilst on the other artefacts have'meanings' that are not language-like (Molino).The problem, as Sperber lucidly shows, is that whilst many claim tobe materialists they still believe in a dualistic universe where thephysical world can be 'explained' in terms of another,abstract, metaphysical domain (think, for example, of Marx'sconcept of superstructure). Ironically, this logic/logocentrism isexemplified in Peebles' obscure account of Popper's fantasy'World 3'. Yet, as Kus eloquently describes, there is a levelof 'sensuous' embedded experience that cannot be transformedinto abstract concepts and Popperian 'objective knowledge'.How, then, are we to approach the sensual and experiential, thesemiotic semiotic/se��mi��ot��ic/ (se?me-ot��ik)1. pertaining to signs or symptoms.2. pathognomonic. in its broadest sense, in the archaeological record? One othermajor theme of this book is the 'sense of measure'(Francfort); the need to specify which archaeological data are actuallyrelevant. Here we must aim to distinguish intentional from purelyaccidental patterns (Chippindale); to find the generative principlesinvolved. Thus, as Molino suggests, quantitative techniques are only asreliable as the variables they measure; just measuring everything tellsus nothing. Of course, you might counter, just saying that we need asense of measure doesn't get us much further. But here, I think,the key question is that of intentionality intentionalityProperty of being directed toward an object. Intentionality is exhibited in various mental phenomena. Thus, if a person experiences an emotion toward an object, he has an intentional attitude toward it. .Of course, structure can exist beyond the intentions of individuals(Chippindale). Not all patterning was intended by those that made it,for clearly humans as agents are not completely 'free' (contraJames Bell's call in this volume for methodological individualism).Yet, in turn, Sperber's critique of dualism applies toChippindale's account; for in order to divorce structure fromindividual intention Chippindale separates thoughts from the actionsthat created the archaeological record. Rather, I suggest, thegenerative process can only originate with thought embedded in action. Apoint amply made in Kus' references to Merleau-Ponty.Indeed, in this volume, both Chippindale and Herzfeld confuse what isbeyond individual intentionality with what is outside human controlaltogether. Herzfeld, in particular, seems to suggest that meaningcollapses once the actor is no longer present. Yet this is to ignore theinnumerable physical structures we see around us. Of course, archaeologyshould he wary of the natural science model (Molino), since form innature is not the product of intention and can have no intrinsicmeaning. However, human artefacts are imbued with meaning through theintentions of their authors. The point, as Sperber says, is to emphasizethat artefacts, as the work of individuals, can only be seen as part ofa tradition. A story must have a history to be a myth; one telling isinsufficient. Similarly, one artefact See artifact. has no meaning in itself except aspart of a tradition; its meaning resides in the perpetuation of sharednnderstandings. The artefact or any other archaeological pattern may notbe the unique product of any individual's intention, but it willalways be the embodiment of distributed/shared intentions throughtime/tradition. This seems to repudiate TO REPUDIATE. To repudiate a right is to express in a sufficient manner, a determination not to accept it, when it is offered. 2. He who repudiates a right cannot by that act transfer it to another. Whitney Davis' search (inthis volume) for the 'first image maker,' since it overlooksthe fact that meaning originates in relations between people, not inindividual minds.The solution, then, to our search for a sense of measure lies inintentionality as expressed in artefacts themselves. Here the irony is(as the editors point out) that whilst the traditionally empiricist em��pir��i��cism?n.1. The view that experience, especially of the senses, is the only source of knowledge.2. a. Employment of empirical methods, as in science.b. An empirical conclusion.3. 'Anglo-Saxons' have followed a rationalist path intohermeneutics and deconstruction, the traditionally rationalist Frenchhave concentrated on pragmatics pragmaticsIn linguistics and philosophy, the study of the use of natural language in communication; more generally, the study of the relations between languages and their users. . Particularly in the fields of lithic lith��ic?1?adj.Consisting of or relating to stone or rock.Adj. 1. lithic - of or containing lithium2. lithic - relating to or composed of stone; "lithic sandstone" and ceramic studies (here represented by Catherine Perles and ValentineRoux Roux, Pierre Paul ��mile 1853-1933.French bacteriologist. His work with the diphtheria bacillus led to the development of antitoxins to neutralize pathogenic toxins. ), French archaeology has sought to demonstrate the intentions ofprehistoric actors as represented in their modalities of production.Through the chaines operatoires of manufacture and use, prehistoricactors imbued material with meaning, and through a pragmatic approach totheir sensuous experience it may be possible to comprehend that meaning.The message, then, is that this book has a lot in it that should notbe casually dismissed as 'very French.' If I have any generalreservations they are purely technical; names/paper titles are notincluded in page headers, which makes it difficult to find individualpapers. Most irritating of all, there is no bloody index!