Response.

Response. First let me thank Professor Leo Leo, in astronomyLeo[Lat.,=the lion], northern constellation lying S of Ursa Major and on the ecliptic (apparent path of the sun through the heavens) between Cancer and Virgo; it is one of the constellations of the zodiac. Klein for his kind comments on mywork, and for his review of Archaeological Theory: An Introduction. Hiscomments are thoughtful and serious, even where I disagree profoundly,though his account of the book is in many respects a misleading one. Iwill respond only to a few aspects of Klejn's arguments. Both the definitions of theory cited by Klejn (Binford and Chang)are positivist pos��i��tiv��ism?n.1. Philosophya. A doctrine contending that sense perceptions are the only admissible basis of human knowledge and precise thought.b. ones. There is nothing wrong with this, but if Klejn andI agree that any objective introduction to theory must acknowledge bothpositivist and non-positivist approaches, it follows that neitherdefinition is satisfactory as an initial statement. To agree withKlejn's implicit definition of theory would be to rulepost-positivist approaches immediately out of court, hardly a balancedor objective position for an account of theory to take. I do not rejectpositivist definitions as Klejn claims, but rather give them as onepossible definition out of several (Johnson 1999: 176). My hesitation inoffering a tight, packaged definition of theory is shared by others:Renfrew & Bahn's Archaeology: The Key Concepts (2005), forexample, does not list 'theory' as a discrete topic. Klejn and I hold different views of what students need. He views itas threatening that students be encouraged to make their own choicebetween different theoretical positions: I view it as essential. As ateacher, it is my responsibility to encourage rather than shut downdebate. Klejn's position seems to me to be directly contradictoryto the role and responsibilities of science, particularly if onebelieves that science could or should have a reflexive and criticalrole. The reasons why many students dislike theory are complex. At theheart of student impatience with theory, I suggest, is a Romantic view:feel the mud on your boots and the wind on your face and you just know(discussed in Johnson forthcoming). Klein cites my account of how, as astudent, I came to see that such a position was not tenable ten��a��ble?adj.1. Capable of being maintained in argument; rationally defensible: a tenable theory.2. . It isdisingenuous to construe construev. to determine the meaning of the words of a written document, statute or legal decision, based upon rules of legal interpretation as well as normal meanings. this as a rejection of the importance ofempirical research. We also hold different views of the relationship between theory andepistemology. Klejn misreads my position: what I wrote, after adiscussion including reference to Wylie, Brumfiel, Trigger, Kohl andothers, was that epistemology was 'essential' though it wasboring (p. 185). Klejn's account offers little clue that I endorsea realist or weak social constructivist con��struc��tiv��ism?n.A movement in modern art originating in Moscow in 1920 and characterized by the use of industrial materials such as glass, sheet metal, and plastic to create nonrepresentational, often geometric objects. position. I am not and havenever been a relativist rel��a��tiv��ist?n.1. Philosophy A proponent of relativism.2. A physicist who specializes in the theories of relativity. . Epistemology is clearly an essential part oftheory, but I sense that Klein wishes to make epistemology and theorycoterminous co��ter��mi��nous?adj.Variant of conterminous.Adj. 1. coterminous - being of equal extent or scope or durationcoextensive, conterminous . There are other issues in theory, most obviously socialtheory and the relationship between politics and archaeology. My statement that 'Klejn ... does not seem to have read theliterature' was unduly acerbic. However, it was made in agreementwith Tim Murray that much of the reasoning to be found in Klein 1993 hada nineteenth century feel to it. For example, remarks like 'I amsorry for [the Aborigines aborigines:see Australian aborigines. ], and I would like to see them bear thebenefits and trials of European civilisation ... as a researcher,however, I am absolutely indifferent to what aborigines may think aboutmy approach to their culture', do appear out of touch, and fullydeserve the robust response Murray gives (Klejn 1993: 510; Murray 1995:292). In reply, Klejn's observation that I do not discusstheoretical traditions outside the English-speaking world is valid(though I had read his 1970s and 80s articles; a conversation betweenthe 1970s Klein and the more narrowly empiricist em��pir��i��cism?n.1. The view that experience, especially of the senses, is the only source of knowledge.2. a. Employment of empirical methods, as in science.b. An empirical conclusion.3. author ofMetaarchaeology would be a fascinating one). The omission will berectified in the second edition of the book, currently in preparation,and I hope due out in 2009. Murray, of course, is hardly a rampant postprocessualist, and theYoffee & Sherratt volume is anything but a postprocessual rant: andhere lies the kernel of Klejn's issues. What he characterises as apostprocessual party line personified by myself (I was intrigued toread, for example, that I was the person responsible for formulating atheory of agency for archaeology) is better characterised as a muchlooser set of concerns. These concerns are shared as much by whatMichelle Hegmon calls 'processual-plus' (Hegmon 2003) as theyare by postprocessual writing. Klein seems to regard a disturbingly widerange of theorists as relativists: as Murray notes, he 'tars allthe contributors [to the Yoffee & Sherratt volume] with the samebroad relativist brush' (Murray 1995:291). I was mistaken in one important respect in the comments I made in1999: I felt then that the case for an emergent consensus wasover-stated. Seven years later, Anglo-American theory is hardlydominated by postprocessualism as Klejn claims. It shies away fromnarrowly relativist or positivist epistemologies; it subscribes toacademic objectivity, but accepts that a political position isunavoidable; it seeks to account for the past, but does so using aseries of concepts (materialisation, agency, gender, context) that arenot narrowly tied to one particular -ism. I am happy to position myselfwithin this consensus, perhaps more so than I was in 1999, and I suspectthe majority of readers of Antiquity, whatever their specialism orintellectual origins, are also. I sense that Klejn's impatience with arguments he finds in mybook is actually a broader impatience with the way Anglo-American theoryis going; and behind this is an unease with the changing nature ofknowledge and intellectual life in the twenty-first century. I sharemuch of Klejn's unease, and welcome the chance to debate thesituation with him, though I disagree over his diagnosis and hisproposed remedy. In my view, it would rule out of court not justpostprocessualism, but the majority of theoretically informed work inarchaeology across the globe. References HEGMON, M. 2003. Setting theoretical egos aside: issues and theoryin North American North Americannamed after North America.North American blastomycosissee North American blastomycosis.North American cattle ticksee boophilusannulatus. archaeology. American Antiquity 68:213-43. KLEJN, L. 1993. It's difficult to be a god. CurrentAnthropology 34:508-11. JOHNSON, M.H. 1999. Archaeological Theory: An Introduction. Oxford:Blackwell. --forthcoming. Ideas of Landscape. Oxford: Blackwell. MURRAY, T. 1995. On Klejn's agenda for theoreticalarchaeology. Current Anthropology 36:2: 290-2. RENFREW, C. & P. BAHN (ed.). 2005. Archaeology: The KeyConcepts. London: Routledge. Matthew Johnson, Department of Archaeology, University ofSouthampton In the most recent RAE assessment (2001), it has the only engineering faculty in the country to receive the highest rating (5*) across all disciplines.[3] According to The Times Higher Education Supplement , UK